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BBS Commentary on Susan Carey, The Origin of Concepts 




Carey’s book describes many cases where children develop new concepts with expressive 
power that could not be constructed out of their input.  How does she side-step Fodor’s 
paradox of radical concept nativism?  I suggest it is by rejecting the tacit assumption that 
psychology can only explain concept acquisition when it occurs by rational inference or other 
transitions that are explicable-by-content. 
Main text 
Representational explanation is central to psychology.  Mental processes are characterised in 
terms of causal transitions between token states, where we make sense of the transitions in 
terms of the content of the states.  Can we explain concept acquisition in the same way?  Only 
insofar as the acquired concept is constructed out of pre-existing concepts, according to Fodor.  
Since most lexical concepts do not seem to be so-constructed, Fodor concludes that they are 
innate – their acquisition is outside the ambit of psychological explanation. 
 
 Carey’s book is a comprehensive refutation of radical concept nativism, offering many 
psychological explanations of concept acquisition, and the data to back them up.  How, then, 
does Carey side-step Fodor’s argument?  I want to suggest that she has to reject the assumption 
that all psychological explanations are explanations-in-virtue-of-content.  Consider two of the 
stages in Carey’s account of the acquisition of number concepts. 
 
 First, the transition from parallel individuation to enriched parallel individuation (being 
a one-knower, two-knower, etc.).  Numerosity is not represented explicitly anywhere in the 
parallel individuation system.  It is implicit in the various operations that are performed on 
object files: adding, subtracting and comparing by 1-1 correspondence.  The child then comes 
to associate words with object files of a certain size, e.g. “one” with having one object file of any 
kind open: {i}.  Is this step explicable-by-content? 
 
 Before becoming a one-knower, the child was not representing one-ness explicitly at 
all: “one” was just a sound, and numerosity was merely implicit in the object file system.  The 
child did not have resources out of which a hypothesis about one-ness could be constructed.  
But there were two important correlations that they could make use of: (1) between having one 
object file {i} open and singleton sets; and (2) between the word “one” and singleton sets (the 
mechanism for which involves the child’s linguistic community).  Although neither is a 
representation of one-ness, these are two pieces of information, of the purely correlational type 
(e.g. Shannon information).  Since the two mental items correlate with the same external-
world property, they tend to occur together, so become associated.  The association between 
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“one” and {i} constitutes a new symbol.  It explicitly represents the numerosity one (i.e. that is 
its wide content). 
 
 I would argue that that transition has not been explained-by-content.  Instead is a 
transition to an entirely new representation, explained in terms of the correlational information 
carried by its precursors.  One of those precursors (“one”) was not representational at all and 
the other ({i}) was not made use of for its content, but just for its informational connections.  
The transition to the new symbol (“one”/{i}) was no kind of inference or other rational 
transition from those pre-existing resources.  Nevertheless, Carey has offered a recognisably 
psychological explanation.  In my view this shows that there can be psychological explanations 
in terms of correlational information that are not explanations-by-content. 
 
 For a second example, consider the transition from enriched parallel individuation to 
being a cardinal principle knower.  This step involves Quinean bootstrapping, the process 
whereby a set of uninterpreted symbols interrelated by a network of inferential dispositions are 
connected up to the world so as to acquire a meaning.  The child’s key resource here is the 
uninterpreted list of counting words: “one”, “two”, … .  At the stage of enriched parallel 
individuation the early words in this sequence have already been put into correlations with 
object files (“one” / {i}), hence numerosities (one-ness).  To give the symbols from “five” 
onwards their content, according to Carey, the child generalises across three transitions in 
which moving to the next count word corresponds to adding one to the object file: 
“one”/{i} → “two”/{i j} 
“two”/{i j} → “three”/{i j k} 
“three”/{i j k} → “four”/{i j k l} 
The child makes a leap which generalises across the instances of adding one – by associating 
them all as instances of counting on.  When he does, “five” is put into a content-constituting 
informational connection with sets of five things – kept track of as the successor to four, which 
the child can track directly with the enriched object file system using its symbol “four”/{i j k l} 
(similarly for “six”, …). 
 
 Is this transition explicable-by-content?  Carey rightly rejects the idea that it is properly 
described as hypothesis testing.  The child is doing something different: building an 
uninterpreted model with the counting words, and then giving that model an interpretation.  
He does not test a hypothesis (a statement formulable with his existing representational 
resources).  Rather, he comes to associate two previously-correlated operations (counting on 
and adding one).  By doing so, he acquires the concept of successor (generalising over instances 
of adding one) and concepts of all the numbers for which he has count words.  Again, Carey has 
described a psychological process that depends upon correlational information but is not 
explicable as a rational inference or other transition-in-virtue-of-content. 
 
 In some places Carey suggests that Quinean bootstrapping is explicable-by-content, 
because even before the transition the uninterpreted placeholders have narrow contents in 
virtue of their inferential roles (p. 522).  Carey has some good arguments for the existence of 
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narrow content, but not in the case of dispositions to make transitions between uninterpreted 
symbols.  The transitions are described in terms of connections between symbol types, where 
the symbols can only be individuated non-semantically.  Once the symbols are put in the right 
relations to acquire wide contents, then we can use inferential dispositions between concepts to 
characterise a second level of narrow content.  However, on pain of regress or holism, the 
inferences that make up the narrow content of a concept should be individuated in terms of the 
wide contents of the concepts which figure in those inferences.  So narrow contents cannot save 
explanation-by-content. 
 
 With hindsight, it is obvious that if we assume that psychological explanation is 
restricted to explanation-by-content, then psychology is going to have a problem explaining the 
acquisition of genuinely new representational resources, because the required contents would 
have to be available before the transition.  Carey’s book gives us compelling reasons for 
relinquishing that assumption. 
 
N.S. 
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